Are the Rūḥ and the Nafs Same or Different?


Author: Muhammad ibn Taqi

The question of whether the rūḥ (spirit) and the nafs (soul/self) are identical or ontologically distinct is not a peripheral linguistic debate; rather, it touches the very foundations of Qurʾānic anthropology, eschatology, moral responsibility, and the metaphysics of human identity. Is the human being animated by two separate immaterial realities—one pure and celestial (rūḥ), the other mutable and morally ambivalent (nafs)? Or are these two terms designations for a single reality described from different perspectives? This study seeks to examine the matter strictly within the Imāmī Shīʿī textual heritage—Qurʾān and reliable aḥādīth—without polemical engagement with external schools, and to determine whether unity or duality is supported by the transmitted evidence.

I. The Scriptural Usage of Rūḥ and Nafs: Initial Observations

The Qurʾān speaks of the origin of human life in terms of the divine breathing:

“So when I have proportioned him and breathed into him of My spirit, then fall down before him in prostration.” (Q 15:29; cf. 38:72)

Here, life begins with the infusion of the rūḥ. There is no prior animation. Ontologically, the entrance of life is attributed exclusively to the breathing of the rūḥ. If that which enters is the cause of life, then—by necessary implication—that which departs must be the cause of death.

Yet the Qurʾān, in describing death, speaks repeatedly of the taking of the nafs:

“If only you could see when the wrongdoers are in the agonies of death and the angels stretch forth their hands [saying]: ‘Bring forth your souls (anfusakum)!’” (Q 6:93)

“God takes the souls (al-anfus) at the time of their death, and those that have not died during their sleep…” (Q 39:42)

“O tranquil soul (al-nafs al-muṭmaʾinnah), return to your Lord, well-pleased and pleasing.” (Q 89:27–28)

Thus, life begins with the infusion of the rūḥ, but death is described as the extraction of the nafs. If these are two truly distinct ontological entities, we are confronted with an apparent contradiction: the cause of life would not be identical with the cause of death. Yet the Qurʾān presents no dual mechanism of animation and de-animation. The simplicity of the Qurʾānic anthropology suggests unity rather than multiplicity.

II. The Seizure in Sleep: Rūḥ or Nafs?

The Qurʾān equates sleep with a provisional taking:

“God takes the souls at the time of their death and those that have not died in their sleep…” (Q 39:42)

Here, the term employed is nafs. However, in a sound Imāmī narration, the language shifts:

“When you rise at night from your sleep, say: ‘Praise be to God who returned my spirit (rūḥī) to me so that I may praise Him and worship Him…’”
Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl, al-ʿAllāma al-Majlisī, vol. 12, p. 306. Ḥadīth no. 12: ḥasan ka-ṣaḥīḥ.

The Qurʾān says the nafs is taken in sleep; the Imām’s supplication speaks of the return of the rūḥ. If these were truly two separate immaterial substances, precision in language would demand consistency. The alternation here indicates semantic interchangeability.

Similarly, in al-Khiṣāl, through a ṣaḥīḥ chain (Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā b. ʿUbayd al-Yaqṭīnī, thiqah), from Abū ʿAbd Allāh (ʿa), it is narrated:

“The spirit of the believer is raised to God, Blessed and Exalted… If its appointed time has come, He places it in the treasuries of His mercy; if not, He sends it back…”
Muʿjam al-Aḥādīth al-Muʿtabarah, al-Muḥsinī, vol. 8, p. 597.

The Qurʾān attributes this seizure to the nafs; the narration attributes it to the rūḥ. The functional identity is the same. Therefore, distinction at the level of reality becomes difficult to sustain.

III. The Moment of Death: Dual Terminology for a Single Event

In Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl, vol. 14, p. 253, ḥadīth no. 25 (ṣaḥīḥ), Abū ʿAbd Allāh (ʿa) narrates the cosmic sequence of death, wherein God decrees:

“I have decreed death upon every soul in which there is spirit (kulli nafsin fīhā rūḥ).”

Here, nafs and rūḥ are mentioned together, not as two departing substances, but as a single living entity described by two aspects. The decree of death applies to the ensouled self—not to two independently separable entities.

Furthermore, the well-known narration concerning embryological development:

imam Abū Jaʿfar (ʿa):

“…Then God sends two creative angels… and they breathe into it the spirit of life and permanence…”
Mirʾāt al-ʿUqūl, vol. 21, p. 23. Ḥadīth no. 4: ṣaḥīḥ.

The narration describes the infusion of the rūḥ as the completion of human identity. Yet before that stage, biological processes unfold. If one posits that the nafs exists independently before the rūḥ, then one must demonstrate textual evidence of a conscious, morally responsible self prior to ensoulment. The transmitted texts do not provide such evidence.

IV. The Conceptual Clarification: Nafs as Selfhood

The Qurʾān uses nafs in contexts where no ontological “substance” is intended, but rather “selfhood”:

“And God warns you of Himself (nafsihi).” (Q 3:28)

“You know what is within myself (nafsī), and I do not know what is within Yourself (nafsik).” (Q 5:116)

Yet God, according to Tawḥīd al-Ṣadūq:

“Indeed God… is One, Ṣamad, without cavity (laysa lahu jawf). Rather, the spirit is a created thing from among His creation…”
Muʿjam al-Aḥādīth al-Muʿtabarah, al-Muḥsinī, vol. 1, p. 241.

If nafs here meant an immaterial organ or created spirit, anthropomorphism would follow. Therefore, in Qurʾānic usage, nafs frequently signifies dhāt—the very self or essence.

Likewise:

“The Day when every soul will come disputing for itself…” (Q 16:111)

It is incoherent to posit a “soul” possessing another “soul.” The term clearly means “self.” Thus, the Qurʾānic semantic range of nafs includes personal identity rather than a distinct ontological substance.

V. Synthesis: One Reality, Two Considerations

From the cumulative textual evidence, the following becomes apparent:

  1. Life begins with the infusion of the rūḥ.

  2. Death and sleep are described as the taking of the nafs.

  3. In authentic supplications, the return of life is described as the return of the rūḥ.

  4. Narrations interchange the terms when describing the same event.

  5. The Qurʾān uses nafs in contexts where only “selfhood” can be intended.

Thus, the distinction—if any—is not ontological but perspectival.

When the subtle, immaterial reality is considered in relation to its divine origin and vitality, it is termed rūḥ. When the same reality is considered as the morally responsible, self-aware subject of obligation, struggle, purification, and return, it is termed nafs.

The difference is therefore one of اعتبار (consideration), not of ذات (essence).

To posit two separate immaterial entities within the human being—one pure and incorruptible, the other mutable—introduces unnecessary multiplicity without decisive textual proof. The burden of proof lies upon the claimant of duality. The transmitted Imāmī corpus, when read holistically, does not compel such a conclusion.

Conclusion

Are the rūḥ and the nafs the same, or are they different?

The preponderance of Qurʾānic usage and ṣaḥīḥ Imāmī narrations indicates that they are one immaterial human reality described under two aspects. The rūḥ designates its life-giving, divine infusion; the nafs designates its selfhood, moral agency, and experiential identity.

There is no decisive evidence within the authoritative Shīʿī textual tradition establishing two independent immaterial substances within the human being. Rather, the unity of the referent—expressed through dual terminology—best reconciles the texts without contradiction.

And God knows best.